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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFORM: A FOCUS ON
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
RODOLPHE J.A. DE SEIFE*
INTRODUCTION
Administrative law reform has been the main topic of conversa-
tion among administrative lawyers since the adoption of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act in 1946. However, little has been done in
a constructive way to achieve logical and cogent reform. Much of the
change has been the result of patchwork reaction to complaints,
resulting in "reform" that falls far short of creating a workable
system.
Many authors, reflecting the malaise in legal circles, have
recently complained about the status of administrative law.1
Numerous suggestions have been made, designed to cure the defi-
ciencies of the present morass in which the administrative process
finds itself.2 To put it plainly, the activities of the administrative
* J.D., Catholic University of America, 1955; LL.M., George Washington
University Law Center, 1965; Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and
Maryland; Professor of Law, Lewis University College of Law. The author wishes to
acknowledge the services of Nicholas P. Black and Richard Shopiro, members of the
Illinois Bar, his former Student Assistants, who effectively participated in the research
of this article.
1. Carrow, Administrative Adjudication: Should Its Role Be Changed? 27
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 279 (1959); Cole, Administrative Agencies and Judicial Powers, 44
A.B.A.J. 953, 954 (1958); Cooper, Administrative Law: The Process of Decision, 44
A.B.A.J. 233 (1958); Fascell, Complexities and Delays in Administrative Procedures
Must Be Eliminated, 46 A.B.A.J. 49 (1960); Hanslowe, The Malaise of the Ad-
ministrative Process, 1962 DUKE L.J. 477; Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis, 30
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1273 (1955); Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the
Administrative Process, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1960); McFarland, Landis Report The
Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness, 47 VA. L. REV. 373 (1961); Miller, A Continuing
Forum for the Reform of the Administrative Process, 27 AD. L. REV. 205 (1975); Ross,
ABA Legislative Proposals to Improve Administrative Procedures in Federal Depart-
ments and Agencies, 27 AD. L. REv. 395 (1975); Rothstein & Rothstein, Administrative
Searches and Seizures: What Happened to Camara and See, 50 WASH. L. REV. 341
(1975).
2. Cary, Why I Oppose the Divorce of the Judicial Function from Federal
Regulatory Agencies, 51 A.B.A.J. 33 (1965); Fascell, supra note 1; Friendly, A Look at
the Federal Administrative Agencies, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 429 (1960); Jones, The Role of
Administrative Agencies as Instruments of Social Reform, 19 AD. L. REV. 279 (1967);
Kramer, supra note 1, at 45, 51; Levinson, Enforcement of Administrative Decisions in
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agencies have become cumbersome,' expensive,' often repetitive5
and represent an enormous waste of time and effort with few
resulting benefits.'
The initial problem, which has not been recently discussed, is
to determine the original concept underlying American ad-
ministrative law. Then, in light of contemporaneous developments,
one may consider whether the review of administrative action is not
the core of the problem with which we have wrestled unsuccessfully
for the past fifty years.
One hardly needs to be reminded of the purpose of ad-
ministrative agencies and the congressional intent behind their crea-
tion. Congress, obviously, could not do all of the legislating in every
area of socio-economic activity. The answer was to create agencies
to which Congress could delegate, within bounds, its legislative func-
tions.7 Concomitant with these quasi-legislative functions are quasi-
executive functions for implementing administrative rules and
regulations,8 and quasi-judicial functions to adjudicate the rights and
interests of parties involved in the administrative process.' The fu-
sion of these three governmental functions within one agency, a
the United States and in France (pts. 1-2), 23 EMORY L.J. 11, 321 (1974); Nathanson,
Proposals for an Administrative Appellate Cour 25 AD. L. REV. 85 (1973).
3. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); Elman, A Modest Proposal for
Radical Reform, 56 A.B.A.J. 1045 (1970); Fascell, supra note 1, at 50.
4. K. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 155; Long, Administrative Proceedings: Their
Time and Cost Can Be Cut Down, 49 A.B.A.J. 833 (1963).
5. Goldman, Administrative Delay and Judicial Relief, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1423
(1968); Leiter, The Equal Employment Opportunities Commission and "Duplicitous
Suits " Examination of EEOC v. Missouri Pacific RR Co., 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1130
(1974).
6. NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965).
7. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). Cf. National Cable Television
Association v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974): "Congress, of course, does
delegate powers to agencies, setting standards to guide their determinations." See also
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S.
470 (1904).
8. E. GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 7 (1972). Organic
Statutes: E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976) (FTC); 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976) (SEC); 16 U.S.C. § 797
(1976) (FPC); 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976) (NLRB); 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (FCC); 49 U.S.C. § 1
(1976) (ICC); 49 U.S.C. § 1323 (1976) (CAB). Rulemaking: SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194, 202 (1947); Pacific States Box and Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935);
The Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564 (1927).
9. See, e.g., FTC v. Flotill Products, 389 U.S. 179 (1967); United States v.
Western Pacific RR Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
303 U.S. 41 (1938); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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phenomenon which many believe to run contrary to our constitu-
tional concepts, has brought many complaints by the bar."0 In trying
to resolve, in an ad hoc manner, the problems of poor administrative
performance,' we have achieved a state of affairs in the area of ad-
ministrative law which some consider almost unbearable.1
2
The original premise of administrative law, which is still valid
today, is that an agency issues regulations in its quasi-legislative
function pursuant to a mission established by Congress and within
the constraints of the organic act of the agency.'3 Regulations pro-
mulgated by an agency are, in fact, often issued by its staff under an
appropriate delegation of power." Similarly, the executive function
of an agency is discharged in enforcement proceedings by an en-
forcement staff.'5 Frequently subpoenas and other official agency
documents are signed by a director of an agency division or the
head of its enforcement division on behalf of the agency.' Ad-
judicatory matters are handled by staff members, who were formerly
known as hearing examiners, acting on behalf of the agency." These
10. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.02 (1958); Caldwell, A
Federal Administrative Court, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 966 (1936); Levinson, supra note 2, at
55; Ross, ABA Legislative Proposals to Improve Administrative Procedures in
Federal Departments and Agencies, 159 A.B.A. REP. 148 (1934).
11. Botein, Primary Jurisdiction: The Need for Better Court/Agency Interac-
tion, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 867, 897 (1976); Hanslowe, supra note 1, at 486; Robinson, The
Administrative Conference and Administrative Law Scholarship, 26 AD. L. REV. 269
(1974).
12. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
Botein, supra note 11.
13. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976) (FTC); 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976) (SEC); 16 U.S.C. §
797 (1976) (FPC); 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976) (NLRB); 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (FCC); 49 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1976) (ICC); 49 U.S.C. § 1323 (1976) (CAB).
14. Wilson & Co. v. United States, 335 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964). See also
Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936); American Telephone and Telegraph Co.
v. FCC, 449 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1971); U.S. Trust Co. v. Blake, 234 N.Y. 273, 137 N.E. 327
(1922); B. SCHWARTZ. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6 (1976); Feller, Prospectus for the Further
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 47 YALE L.J. 647 (1938); Note, Subdelegation
by Federal Administrative Agencies, 12 STAN. L. REV. 808 (1960).
15. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1) (1976).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1976). Cf. Fleming v. Mollowk Wreckers and Lumber
Co., 331 U.S. 111 (1947) (District Directors of Price Control Administration delegated
authority to issue subpoenas). Contra, Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357
(1942); 15 U.S.C. § 53 (1976) (Power of FTC to enjoin false advertising); 15 U.S.C. § 77(t)
(1976) (SEC subpoena power and enforcement); 16 U.S.C. § 825(m) (1976) (FPC subpoena
power and enforcement).
17. Note 14, supra. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951);
Allentown Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 222 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1954); NLRB v. James,
208 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1954); Administrative Procedure Act, § 8(a), 5 U.S.C. § 557 (1976).
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hearing officers are now our administrative law judges."8
Responsible and effective reform must arise from a considera-
tion of the proper place and function of the hearing examiners, or
administrative law judges. This article puts forward a proposal for
revamping our troubled administrative law system based on the con-
cept that a scheme cannot function properly if we have conflicting
statutory mandates made less intelligible by conflicting court deci-
sions. Thus, a separate system of administrative law courts is needed
to review agency decisions, thereby restoring the hearing examiners
to their proper role. This proposal is logically based on sound
historical concepts that are needed to effectively respond to the
various reasons for reform.
THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The Need For Administrative Agencies
Some authors have written extensively on the administrative
agencies.19 They have been called the fourth branch of the govern-
ment,M and many less flattering things."' It is appropriate at this
juncture to review some fundamentals.
Congress has the authority to delegate certain of its powers.'
18. 37 Fed. Reg. 16787 (1972); Cramton, A Title Change for Hearing Ex-
aminer? "A Rose by Any Other Name ..." 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 918 (1972);
Zwerdling, Reflections of the Role of an Administrative Law Judge, 25 AD. L. REV. 9
(1973).
19. H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BET-
TER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS (1962); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6 (1976);
Auerbach, Should Administrative Agencies Perform Adjudicatory Functions?, 1959
WIs. L. REV. 95; Dixon, The Independent Commissions and Political Responsibility, 27
AD. L. REV. 1 (1975); Levy, Positive View of Commission Regulation: Revisited, 41 ICC
PRAC. J. 430 (1974); Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, 1 J. LEGAL.
STUD. 305 (1972); Rotunda, The Combination of Functions in Administrative Actions:
An Examination of European Alternatives, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 101 (1972); Williams,
Fifty Years of the Law of the Federal Administrative Agencies-and Beyond, 29 FED.
B.J. 267 (1970); Comment, Administrative Agencies, the Public Interest and National
Policy. Is a Marriage Possible? 59 GEO. L.J. 420 (1970); 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 1157 (1976).
20. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform: The Effects of S. 1663 on
the Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings, 16 AD. L. REV. 108 (1963); Dixon, supra note
19, at 1; Elman, supra note 3, at 1048; McFarland, supra note 1, at 391; Rotunda, supra
note 19, at 101.
21. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
Beelar, Impact of the Administrative Process on the Judicial Branch of the Govern-
ment, 16 FED. B.J. 501, 503 (1956) ("Frankenstein-like implications"); Dixon, supra note
19, at 5; Williams, supra note 19, at 267.
22. National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974);
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It does so by creating agencies in order to implement a broadly
worded statute, leaving many details which it cannot police itself to
these creatures of congressional power." Every organic act of Con-
gress provides that the agency created thereunder shall be account-
able to Congress either directly ' or indirectly through the Presi-
dent." This is usually done by way of annual reports and budget
submissions."
Congress has given agencies the task of making rules to imple-
ment the legislative intent evinced in the agencies' organic acts.' In
this capacity the agency acts as a legislator.28 Furthermore, the
agencies are usually charged with the enforcement of the very rules
and regulations they promulgate," as well as laws passed by Con-
gress.0 Many agencies, particularly the licensing agencies,8 ad-
judicate adverse interests either between different parties 2 or be-
tween the agency and an outside party.3 Thus the agencies combine
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 274 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring); Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Sunshine Anthrocite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S.
381, 398 (1940); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Honolulu Rapid Transit
& Land Co. v. Territory of Hawaii, 211 U.S. 282 (1908); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S.
470 (1904).
23. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965); 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 151 (1976) (Labor
Management Relations Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-32 (1976) (Environmental Protec-
tion Agency); 47 U.S.C. § 154 (1976) (FCC); 49 U.S.C. § 12 (1976) (ICC); 49 U.S.C. § 1324
(1976) (CAB).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 4341 (1976) (EPA Reports to Congress); 47 U.S.C. § 155 (1976)
(FCC Reports to Congress); 49 U.S.C. § 21 (1976) (ICC Annual Report to Congress); 49
U.S.C. § 1325 (1976) (CAB Annual Report to Congress).
25. Address by E. McIntyre (Commissioner of FTC), Fed. Bar Ass'n, Wash.,
D.C. (Jan. 1, 1969), Regulatory Independence: Factual or Fanciful, printed in 115 CONG.
REC. 1835 (1969). Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Springer v. Philippine
Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1922). See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 121 (1976); 31 U.S.C. §§ 11, 16 (1976)
(Budget and Accounting Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341, 4344 (1976).
26. See, e.g., note 24, supr. See also Dixon, supra note 19, at 6-12.
27. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976); 47 U.S.C. § 315(c) (1976). See G. ROBINSON & E.
GELLHORN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 29 (1974).
28. Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 771, 797 (1976).
29. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). E.g., 15
U.S.C. §§ 45, 46 (1976).
30. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 53 (1976).
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1371 (1976); 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). See Dean, The Opportunity
to Be Heard in the Professional Licensing Process in Pennsyvlania 67 DICK. L. REV.
31 (1962).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976); 47 U.S.C. § 208 (1976).
33. 47 U.S.C. § 303(m) (1976); 49 U.S.C. § 16 (1976).
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under one roof the three powers which the Constitution ordinarily
separates."
In theory, the check and balance system works quite well. The
executive executes the laws of Congress, while the judiciary decides
issues arising under that execution." In practice, of course, it does
not work quite that simply.3' The President, on occasion, makes laws
by issuing executive orders.3 ' He may also make proclamations
under authority vested in him by Congress in certain emergency
situations' and assume a substantial portion of the legislative task.
3 9
Obviously, the executive also enforces the laws of Congress and the
"laws" created by executive order."0
Moreover, the courts have not been content to sit back and
merely adjudicate. They have gone so far as to legislate,4 and the
trend is towards increased judicial legislation.2 There is frequent
criticism of the fact that nonelected judges are legislating the con-
duct of citizens.'3 All this, of course, comes from the simple rule that
"nature abhors a vacuum."" Thus, when one branch of government
34. Macy, The APA and the Hearing Examiner: Products of a Viable Political
Society, 27 FED. B.J. 351, 354 (1967); PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT, REPORT WITH SPECIAL STUDIES 39-40 (1937).
35. G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 26 (1974).
36. G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN. supra note 35, at 27; Miller, Separation of
Powers: An Ancient Doctrine Under Modern Challenge, 28 AD. L. REV. 299 (1976);
Moore, Contemporary Issues in an Ongoing Debate: The Roles of Congress and the
President in Foreign Affairs, 7 INT'L. LAW 733 (1973).
37. E.g., Exec. Order No. 10854, 24 Fed. Reg. 9565 (1959), as amended by,
Exec. Order No. 11382, 32 Fed. Reg. 16247 (1967); Proclamation No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg.
9029 (1950).
38. See note 37 supra; Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952).
39. E.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1510 (1976). It should be noted that the various executive
departments have spawned numerous "agencies" which, unlike the "congressional" or
"independent" agencies, are under the direct authority of the President. This is a sub-
tle but important distinction which has been forgotten by recent White House oc-
cupants, an apparently deliberate "oversight" to which Congress has not reacted with
the vigor that one might have expected.
40. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1976).
41. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928); Meyers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Auerbach, supra note 19, at 114.
42. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
43. Bricker, Judicial Legislation. A Threat to Constitutional Government, 21
OKLA. B.A.J. 639 (1950); Vom Baur, The Impact of the Administrative Process on the
Executive Branch of the Government, 16 FED. B.J. 453, 463-64 (1956).
44. B. SPINOZA, ETHICS. Pt. I, Proposition 15 (Everyman ed., A. Boyle trans.
1955).
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does not function as it should, of necessity, one of the other branches
will step in to alleviate social discontent which, in other countries,
may blossom into revolution. 5 The commingling of functions within an
agency, therefore, is not necessarily as unusual or evil as some have
said.'6
The Congressional Power of Delegation
It is evident that Congress delegates certain of its powers to
an agency which is run by people, either board members, 7 or com-
missioners'8 or a director." The law stops there.5 The agencies in
turn, as a matter of managerial convenience, set up subordinate
positions and delegate powers to their employees." Like Congress,
the appointed agency members cannot accomplish all the assigned
tasks on a first-hand basis.2 This leads to the creation and appoint-
ment of hearing examiners," who hear cases, ascertain facts and
come up with a recommended decision for the agency.5' No organic
statute states that Congress delegates its power to the agency and
to the hearing examiners,' or, as they are now known by Civil Ser-
vice Commission fiat, the administrative law judges." The central
issue, which has been consistently overlooked, thus becomes the prop-
er function of the hearing examiner in the overall role of an ad-
ministrative agency.
45. Ratner, Executive Privilege, Self-Incrimination, and the Separation of
Powers Illusion, 22 UCLA L. REV. 92 (1974).
46. Cragun & de Siefe, A Skeptic Views Twenty-Five Years of Ad-
ministrative Process, 16 FED. B.J. 556 (1956); Gatchell, The Impact of the Ad-
ministrative Process on the Judicial Branch of the Government: A Defense of the
Status Quo, 16 FED. B.J. 482 (1956).
47. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976) (NLRB); 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1976) (EPA); 49
U.S.C. § 154 (1976) (ICC); 49 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1324 (1976) (CAB).
48. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1976) (FTC); 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (1976) (SEC); 16 U.S.C. §
792 (1976) (FPC); 47 U.S.C. § 154 (1976) (FCC); 49 U.S.C. § 11 (1976) (ICC).
49. Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, 401 U.S. 137, reh. denied, 402 U.S. 925
(1971). E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 172 (1976); 40 U.S.C. § 751 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 4276(c) (1976); 49
U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
50. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57, 704 (1976).
51. FTC v. Flotill Products, Inc., 389 U.S. 179 (1967); Morgan v. United States,
298 U.S. 468 (1936); American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. FCC, 449 F.2d 439 (2d
Cir. 1971); U.S. Trust Co. v. Blake, 234 N.Y. 273, 137 N.E. 327 (1922). E.g., 5 U.S.C. §
301 (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976).
52. Morgan v. United States, 449 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1971); U.S. Trust Co. v.
Blake, 234 N.Y. 273, 137 N.E. 327 (1922); 5 U.S.C. § 302(b) (1976).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1976).
54. Cramton, supra note 18.
55. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 557 (1976).
56. Civil Service Commission Order, August 19, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 16787
(1972) (codified in 5 C.F.R. § 930.203a (1973)).
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The Role of the Administrative Law Judge
Much discussion has centered on the separation of functions
within agencies." To some extent, this has been achieved by ad hoc
reforms." The status of hearing examiners has been "upgraded" by
awarding them the coveted title of "administrative law judges,"'"
whether or not they are, in fact, "judges."'O The truth remains that
the ALJs are employees of a particular agency, and there has been
a groundswell of opinion among many administrative law judges
that somehow this role is too confining. 1 Moreover, agencies are
subject to the accusation that the administrative law judges are too
close to the staff and the appointed agency heads for which they
work. " It is therefore suggested that a separate corps of ad-
ministrative law judges be created. Unfortunately, this is no
panacea, and demonstrably so.
The concept of an independent corps of administrative law
judges has a good deal of merit, but for reasons other than those
given by its proponents, since they do not share this author's view
of the ALJ's role in the administrative scheme." To perform properly,
the administrative agencies should be allowed to function in all
three of the fields enumerated above: quasi-legislative, quasi-
executive (enforcement) and quasi-judicial (adjudication). Each one of
these agency activities may be in need of reform, but this must be
done at the proper level. Thus, any proposed standards in rule-
making functions should be assessed from the legislative perspec-
tive, any changes in the agencies' executive functions ought to be
proposed on the basis of enforcement standards, and the adequacy
of their adjudicatory role should be assessed from the judicial
perspective.
57. Friendly, supra note 2; Hector, Problems of the C.A.B. and Independent
Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960); Robinson, The Making of Ad-
ministrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Ad-
ministrative Procedural Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1970).
58. Friendly, supra note 2, at 441.
59. 5 C.F.R. § 930.203e (1977); Segal, The Administrative Law Judge, 62
A.B.A.J. 1424, 1425 (1976).
60. Segal, supra note 59.
61. Minow, Suggestions for Improvement of the Administrative Process, 15
AD. L. REV. 146 (1963); Pfeiffer, Hearing Cases Before Several Agencies-Odyssey of
an Administrative Law Judge, 27 AD. L. REV. 217 (1975); Rotunda, supra note 19, at
121; Segal, supra note 59.
62. Cragun & de Siefe, supra note 46.
63. Pfeiffer, supra note 61; Segal, supra note 59, at 1425.
64. Pfeiffer, supra note 61.
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In this article the focus is on the need for reform in the area of
adjudication, without forgetting that the other two areas in which
agencies operate are also in need of comprehensive reform. In the
area of agency adjudication, the most controversial agency activity,
the focus is on "judicial" review to insure fair and impartial agency
action." Of course, where appropriate, the legislative or rule-making
activity of an agency may also be subject to judicial review.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE: A PROPOSAL
There is little doubt that change is needed in the field of ad-
ministrative law. That need becomes even more apparent with the
proliferation of administrative agencies.6 Twenty-two years ago, the
issue of the Federal Bar Journal celebrating the twenty-fifth an-
niversary of the administrative law system was replete with sugges-
tions for change."7
The administrative process is no longer a cheap and efficient
way of getting the work of government done.8 If anything, the un-
tiring efforts of the legal profession 8 and the consequent over-
judicialization of the administrative process"0 have made ad-
ministrative law cases more expensive, cumbersome and lengthy
than regular trials, 1 thus defeating the very purpose underlying the
creation of administrative agencies. The courts now second-guess
agency decisions by looking at the recommended decisions of ad-
ministrative law judges. 2 This is comparable to second-guessing a
judge by looking at his clerk's draft of the court's decision.
Administrative law is needlessly confusing because the special
functions and purpose of administrative agencies have not been ac-
65. See Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713 (1969).
66. Kendall, Some Observations About the Administrative Process, 11 AD. L.
BULL. 62, 68-69 (1958).
67. Beelar, supra note 21; Cragun & de Siefe, supra note 46; Gatchell, supra
note 46; Kintner, The Administrative Process Comes of Age, 16 FED. B.J. 539 (1956);
Pound, Foreword to 16 FED. B.J., at 445 (1956); Schwartz, The Administrative Process
and Congressional Control, 16 FED. B.J. 519 (1956); Vom Baur, supra note 43.
68. Goldman, supra note 5.
69. Bernstein, The Regulatory Process: A Framework for Analysis, 26 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 329, 330 (1961); Cramton, Causes and Cures of Administrative Delay,
58 A.B.A.J. 937 (1972).
70. Auerbach, supra note 19, at 109; Goldman, supra note 5, at 1424. See K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.04-14 (1976) (quoting Ash Council findings);
Robinson, supra note 57.
71. W. GARDNER, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS: LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY
AND TOMORROW (M. Paulsen ed. 1959).
72. Zwerdling, supra note 18.
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cepted by the bar. Rather, the bar has insisted on casting the ad-
ministrative process in a familiar but inappropriate mold. 3 It is
doubtful that the adversary method of proving a case, which to most
lawyers is the cornerstone of the American legal system, is
desirable in an administrative forum."' Administrative law judges,
when they proceed by way of adversary testimony, very often
create situations in which very little "fairness" is apparent simply
because the process is too time-consuming and expensive. 5
Numerous changes are required to make administrative law a viable
process. Scholars have written on the subject at length and have
testified about it before Congress. 6
The time has come to take a fresh look at the many proposals
of administrative law reform by addressing some fund-amental con-
cepts which are too often ignored. In so doing, a workable proposal
may be reached for reform of the administrative process which
could accommodate the many disparate needs which now exist.
The Need for a Complete Overhaul of Administrative Procedure
Changes in the field of administrative law are the result of a
patchwork approach.77 To some extent the Administrative Procedure
Act" itself is the result of this method of operating, as are its
amendments,79 which sometimes set out provisions that are con-
tradictory" or at least not easily reconcilable with each other. The
73. Pending Proposals to Amend the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.
An Analysis of S. 518, 20 AD. L. REV. 185, 215 (1967) (roundtable discussion, Aug. 8,
1967; remarks of C. Byse).
74. Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1974, 27 AD. L. REV. 113,
122-23 (1975).
75. Id
76. Elman, supra note 3.
77. Elman, supra note 3; Gellhorn, Administrative Procedure Reform: Hardy
Perennia4 48 A.B.A.J. 243 (1962); Hanslowe, supra note 1; Hector, supra note 57;
Minow, Suggestions for Improvement of the Administrative Process, 15 AD. L. REV.
146 (1963); Nathanson, supra note 2; Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the
President-Elect (Submitted by the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary) 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1960).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 550 et seq. (1976).
79. 5 U.S.C. § 557 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. 94-409, § 4(a), 90 Stat. 1246.
E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended by Pub. L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383, as amended by Pub.
L. 90-23, § 1, 81 Stat. 54, as amended by Pub. L. 93-502 §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561-64, as
amended by Pub. L. 94-409, § 5(b), 90 Stat. 1247.
80. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 557(e) (1976) with 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1976). Compare 5
U.S.C. § 557 (1976) with 37 Fed. Reg. 16787 (1972), which changed the appellation of
"hearing examiner" to that of "administrative law judge" without changing the in-
dividual's status within the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976) also is a source of conflict.
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result is court decisions which are difficult to analyze and under-
stand. 1 This is not primarily the fault of the courts, but rather the
fault of the legislative drafters and those who lobby their amend-
ments through congressional committees.
The Administrative Law Conference of the United States, to
which Congress delegated some of its work in the field of monitor-
ing administrative law, 2 has not produced anything very mean-
ingful. Most of its changes are the product of its close relationship
with the Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion.8 It is unrealistic to expect lawyers in a specialized field to ask
for anything other than what will benefit either their practice or
their clients.' This is in no way derogatory of the scholarly and
often monumental work performed by the Administrative Law Sec-
tion of the ABA. Nevertheless, the intimate relationship between
the Administrative Law Section of the ABA and the Administrative
Law Conference of the United States is one cause of the patchwork
manner in which real or imagined needs for change have been met.
This lack of creativity, ability or willingness to deal in broad
concepts on the part of the organized bar is the main reason for the
present state of near disaster in the administrative process.85 The
same unimaginative approach is apparent in the various proposed
81. E.g., NLRB v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975); United States
ex rel. Brzovich v. Holton, 222 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1955); General Motors Corp. v. United
States, 359 F. Supp. 1168 (E.D. Mich. 1973); National Freight, Inc. v. United States, 359
F. Supp. 1153 (D.N.J. 1973); Central and Southern Motor Tariff Ass'n v. United States,
273 F. Supp. 823 (D. Del. 1967); Younger Bros. Inc. v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 859
(S.D. Tex. 1965); Deioma Trucking Inc. v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Cal.
1964); Youngblood Truck Lines v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 809 (W.D.N.C. 1963);
North American Van Lines v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 837 (N.D. Ind. 1963); T.S.C.
Motor Freight Lines v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 777 (S.D. Tex. 1960); Watson Bros.
Transportation v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 732 (D. Neb. 1960); Green v. Kern, 178 F.
Supp. 201 (D.N.J. 1959); Canadian Pacific Ry. v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 248 (D.
Minn. 1958); Kenny v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 971 (D.N.J. 1952); Aero Mayflower
Transit Co. v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1951). Similar prob-
lems arise when one examines the cases which attempt to assign the weight that an
agency should give to its Hearing Examiner's findings. See Universal Camera v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
82. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-76 (1976).
83. Harrison, Co-operation for Improvement in Administrative Law, 60
A.B.A.J. 1538 (1974).
84. See generally Cooper, Needed: A Second Attorney General's Committee,
15 AD. L. REV. 3, 4 (1963); Friedman, Special Interest and the Law, 51 CH. BAR REC.
434 (1970).
85. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1975).
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court reforms. The appointment of more court personnel will not im-
prove the present catastrophic state of affairs in the judicial arena"
any more than the creation of more administrative law judges 7 will
remedy the administrative law problem. Instead of responding to
the individual needs of special interest groups before certain agen-
cies," the bar must take a broader view of what is necessary for
society if reform is to be meaningful.
A fundamental change in attitude is needed. To some extent
the key to a plausible solution to the dilemma is found by looking to
the fundamental objectives of administrative law.89 The purpose of
administrative law" in relation to societal needs, present and future,
rather than the narrow needs of our clients and our practice, must
be stressed.
The Proper Place of the Administrative Law Judge
Much has been said of the need for judicial reform,91 the
necessity of increasing the number of federal judges,92 and the adop-
tion of an independent corps of administrative law judges. 3 Little
consideration has been given to the crucial determination of exactly
what function the administrative law judge should fulfill.
To advocate the creation of an independent corps of ad-
ministrative law judges working at the agency level, thus making
the ALJs responsible for the initial decision, makes the agency an
appellate review board," and robs the agency of its total ad-
ministrative power. This dichotomy encourages the emergence of a
situation in which the federal courts will, of necessity, look more
86. Cramton, supra note 69, at 937, 939, 941; McRae, Administration of
Justice in the Federal District Cour 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 237, 239 (1971).
87. Auerbach, supra note 19, at 109; Cramton, supra note 69, at 937, 940.
88. Cragun & de Siefe, supra note 46; Friedman, supra note 84.
89. Freedman, supra note 85, at 1045, 1052. See Jones, supra note 2.
90. J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938); E. ROOT, ADDRESSES ON
CITIZENSHIP AND GOVERNMENT (1916); Williams, supra note 19.
91. Ashman & Parness, The Concept of a Unified Court System, 24 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1 (1974); Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Court of Appeals: The Threat
to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969);
D'Alemberte, Let The Sunshine I" The Case for an Open Judiciary System, 58
JUDICATURE 61 (1974); Nathanson, supra note 2; Symposium-Judicial Reform, 23 U.
FLA. L. REV. 217 (1971).
92. Nathanson, supra note 2, at 91.
93. Pfeiffer, supra note 61.
94. Pending Proposals to Amend the Federal Administrative Procedure Ack"
An Analysis of S. 518, 20 AD. L. REV. 187 (1967) (roundtable discussion, Aug. 8, 1967).
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and more to the administrative law judge as the originator of the
administrative process, rather than focus properly on the agency."
This suggestion, without more, is not acceptable in theory, nor is it
sound in practice since it will result in needless confusion as to
where the initial decision-making power lies in the administrative
scheme, compounding present problems."
Under the Administrative Procedure Act "all decisions,
including initial, recommended, or tentative decisions, shall become
a part of the record . . ... " The problem with the word "recom-
mended" in this context is that it is subject to varying interpreta-
tions. A recommended decision could be a decision that the agency
labels as "recommended" because it is a tentative or initial decision.
However, "recommended" is also a word of art familiar to the
administrative law practioners who advocated the adoption of the
Administrative Procedure Act. It is quite possible that Congress
might not have focused on the potential significance of that word as
including the recommendation or decision made by the hearing ex-
aminer, now the administrative law judge. Thus the foundation was
laid for the erroneous interpretation of the role of the ALJ in the
administrative process.
It is not purely academic exercise to stress that today's ad-
ministrative law judge is out of place in the administrative scheme.
Proposals to move him around in the administrative organization on
the agency level, even to the extent of making him fully independ-
ent, will not work. 8 Lines of authority must reflect the statutory
theory of delegation of power, and it is not too much to say that our
present-day administrative "camel," a product of the so-called prag-
matic approach, does not and probably cannot do the job it is assign-
ed to do.
There have been too many changes and amendments made in
committee which distort the basic functions and purpose of ad-
ministrative agencies. It is time to streamline the system so that it
can work more efficiently and still not do violence to the constitu-
tional underpinnings of the administrative process. It is apparent
that if the system is to work and maintain fairness along with effi-
ciency, the agencies must go back to the tasks assigned by Congress
95. Note 94, supra (remarks of R. Ginnane).
96. Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); 5 U.S.C. § 557 (1976); 37
Fed. Reg. 16787 (1972). See also note 81, supra.
97. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1976) (emphasis supplied).
98. Zwerdling, supra note 18, at 12-13.
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and pay more attention to the reviewing process. This, along with a
suitably amended APA, should insure the requisite fairness. The ad-
ministrative law judge seems to be the natural candidate as a
reviewer of agency action.
A New Focus on an Old Concept
It is not the purpose of this article to advocate radical reform
for its own sake, but to recommend a restructuring of the present
administrative system, reconciling it, in some ways, with the classic
thinking in administrative law.9" However, one must also use a more
contemporary approach by reorienting traditional precedent-
conscious thinking into relatively new channels best designed to
alleviate present administrative law problems, thereby helping the
judicial system as a whole.
Under this proposal an administrative agency would handle all
matters within its jurisdiction as intended by Congress. °' ° Unfet-
tered by undue judicialization'' or artificial separation of functions
concepts,0 2 it would nevertheless adhere to the substantive re-
quirements of administrative due process and fair hearing 10 as
prescribed by the present APA and the courts. This would mean
that the agencies would revert to doing their work, albeit by their
employees to whom they delegate certain powers as a matter of in-
ternal management. This, of course, includes hearing officers in both
rule-making and adjudicatory proceedings. 10 4
On the other hand, this proposal would also entail the removal
of the most able of the present administrative law judges, among
those who are really "judges,'"" not to an independent ALJ
99. J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938); E. ROOT. ADDRESSES ON
CITIZENSHIP AND GOVERNMENT (1916); Jones, supra note 2.
100. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976) (FTC); 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1976) (SEC). See Smith,
Improving the Administration of Justice in Administrative Processes, 30 A.B.A.J.
127, 128-29 (1944).
101. Note, Intermediate Appellate Review Boards for Administrative Agen-
cies, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (1968).
102. Bernstein, supra note 69, at 331.
103. Smith, supra note 100, at 131.
104. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); 5 U.S.C. § 557(b)
(1976). The concept of Hearing Examiners will have gone back to its original meaning.
105. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 976 (4th ed. 1951):
Judge: An officer so named in his commission, who presides in some
court; a public officer, appointed to preside and to administer the law in a
court of justice; the chief member of a court, and charged with the control
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corps,'" but to a new level of administrative review outside the agen-
cies-the Administrative Court. In that system, the administrative
law judges would properly function in their judicial capacity in that
they would review agency action to decide whether or not it con-
formed to the applicable law.'01
Above this first layer of administrative law judges (or the new
Administrative Law Court) would sit a Supreme Administrative
Law Court to review appeals from the Administrative Law Courts,
probably on a certiorari basis.'°8 This Supreme Administrative Law
Court would determine, with finality, all issues arising from ad-
judicatory as well as rule-making matters. The only appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States would lie in cases involving
substantial constitutional issues.19 It is possible, for the sake of ex-
pediency and fairness, as well as economics, that genuine constitu-
tional issues could be settled upon initial motion to an ad-
ministrative law judge, and certified by the Supreme Administrative
Law Court to the Supreme Court of the United States. This would
mean the adoption of a new type of expediting act wherein fun-
damental constitutional issues involving the validity of an organic
statute could be resolved without waiting for a determination of all
the other issues in a case which might be rendered moot.
of proceedings and the decision of questions of law or discretion. Todd v.
U.S., [sic] 158 U.S. 278, 15 S. Ct. 889, 39 L.Ed. 982 ....
This definition is used herein to distinguish a "judge" from an "examiner" within the
meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 557 (1976), who acts only as the initial eyes and ears of an ad-
ministrative agency (i.e., the statutorily appointed member or members), and whose
decision may be accepted or rejected by the agency as a whole. Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). There is no more compelling rationale for an agen-
cy to follow the recommended decisions of a "hearing examiner" than there is for a
judge to feel bound by his clerk's recommended draft of a decision in a case heard by
the judge. Conceptually, the agency is the "judge" and the hearing examiner (or ALJ,
as he is now misnamed) is the "clerk" in the administrative process.
It is after the final agency decision has been rendered that a party has "ex-
hausted his administrative remedies" and may seek redress in a federal district court,
which may review the administrative action to determine whether or not the agency's
decision is based upon "substantial evidence" or whether its action was "arbitrary or
capricious." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976). See also McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185
(1969); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
106. See Pfeiffer, supra note 61.
107. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), in accordance with the requirements of 5 U.S.C. §§
701, 704 (1976).
108. Certiorari is generally a discretionary writ. See Whaley v. Whaley, 213
Ark. 232, 209 S.W.2d 871 (1948); Lennon v. School District No. 11, Greer County, 189
Okla. 37, 113 P.2d 382 (1941). See also Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
109. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178, 180 (1803).
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This concept of administrative courts is at variance with pro-
posals such as the one made by Professor Rotunda,11 whose objec-
tives are worthy but whose theory relies on a questionable com-
parative analysis of the basic concepts underlying administrative
law in Europe. His conclusion that political pressure in the United
States makes it impossible to change our system may be valid, but
is based upon an inadequate analysis of the differences between the
basic judicial systems in the United States and Europe.
The legal system of the United States does not adhere to a
private-versus-public concept of the law as does the civil system.
Thus, anything involving the government of France, such as the
driver of a mail truck colliding with a privately owned vehicle, or
the President of the Republic issuing an illegal decree,"' comes
under the jurisdiction of administrative law. 12 The recourse to legal
solutions of problems in foreign countries in order to promote solu-
tions to our own legal problems is most commendable, but cannot be
done without a thorough understanding of the differences between
the legal systems; differences based on history, national traditions
or social philosophies.
Conversely, a thorough and correct analysis of our own con-
cepts of administrative law may show the way to meaningful reform.
The fact that the reform proposed herein, to some extent, may look
like the French system does not make it so, nor is the importation of
the French system proposed. On the contrary, the adoption of a new
"management" approach to handle administrative law is advocated.
This approach would be based on an American viewpoint of the law,
and geared to needs under an American constitutional philosophy of
government.'"
110. Rotunda, supra note 19.
111. E.g., The Canal case, Recueil das Decisions du Conseil d'Etat, October 19,
1962; [1973] J.C.P. II 13068. In this case the French Council of State annulled the or-
dinance of June 1, 1962, issued by President de Gaulle, which established a military
court of justice undei the provisions of the Law of April 8, 1962.
112. Riesenfeld, French System of Administrative Justice: A Model for
American Law? (pt. 1), 18 B.U.L. REv. 48, 82 (1938).
113. The contemporary involvement of law reformers in foreign concepts such
as ombudsmen (a system which works in Scandanavia but will not work in the U.S.) is
commendable. Literature dealing with such proposals fills shelves of our law libraries,
but proposals to adopt foreign concepts are generally worthless in view of our own
tradition and "legal mythology." For instance, at what point would the American
political establishment be willing to give all-encompassing powers to an "ombudsman"
such as his Swedish counterpart possesses? It is not, therefore, very productive to ad-
vocate the importation of foreign concepts without reconciling them with our own
traditions, views and prejudices, regardless of their merit or efficacy in their country
of origin.
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Impact of the Proposed Administrative Law Reform on the Federal
Judicial System
The dockets in many of the federal courts are so crowded that
the delivery of justice is severely restricted.' While overload of the
court dockets is due to many factors,"'5 one factor which plays an in-
creasing role is the growing load of administrative law appeals to
the district courts, ' circuit courts of appeals"' and even to the
Supreme Court."8 According to statistics prepared for this article, it
is apparent that the overall administrative law caseload, while re-
maining relatively constant in most district courts in recent years,
has dramatically increased in the last year, 1976, accounting for
32.2% of the total caseload." 9 This increase is not apparent at the
court of appeals level, but nevertheless represents a substantial pro-
portion of the cases handled. No less than ten percent to as much as
slightly over fourteen percent of the cases in any one year for the
period 1971-1976 dealt with administrative law problems."'
The remedy does not lie in simply appointing more judges,"'
even assuming that with other measures we will improve the quality
of the bar'" and, hopefully, the judiciary (a notion which some of the
judges who are the most vocal in criticizing the bar seem to
forget).' 3 Merely adding numbers to the courts' personnel will not
alleviate the problems involved in the determination of ad-
ministrative law cases, if for no other reason than most judges do
not particularly relish administrative law cases and are not equip-
ped to deal with them.
This is not to say that we should be afraid of creating new
courts,'' but we should create the right "type" of courts and not be
114. Goldman, supra note 5.
115. Burger, Bringing the Judicial Machinery Up to the Demands Made Upon
It, 42 PA. B.A.Q. 262 (1970); Cramton, supra note 69.
116. Table III, infra, page 254.
117. Table II, infra, page 253.
118. Table I, infra, page 252,
119. The administrative caseload has changed from 21.4% of the total caseload
in 1975 to 32.2% in 1976. See Table III, infra, page 254.
120. See Table II, infra, page 253.
121. McRae, supra note 86.
122. Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211 (1971); Burger, The
State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 934 (1970).
123. Speaking from experience gathered over the last twenty-odd years, the
author feels free to state that in the District of Columbia, where the number of judges
in the local courts has increased dramatically, the situation is, if anything, more dismal
today than it was ten or fifteen years ago.
124. Pound, supra note 67, at 449.
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motivated solely by a commendable desire to ease the workload of
the present judges."5 A system of administrative law courts is
precisely the type of new court that should be created. This would
not only do much to improve the administrative process, but would
also redistribute the judicial workload by substantially lightening
that of the federal courts, including the Supreme Court of the
United States.126
The Importance of Expertise
Part of our legal mythology is the fallacious belief that merely
clothing a person with a black robe endows him or her with omni-
science. This peculiar myth is one of many that may impair our con-
tinued existence as a dynamic and democratic society and result in
nefarious consequences in the form of delayed, expensive and in-
creasingly formalistic justice.
Expertise (true expertise, not that which the Supreme Court
often assigns to agencies)" is important in the field of ad-
ministrative law because to some extent the statutory issues and
the methods of arriving at conclusions and decisions are different
from run-of-the-mill civil or criminal controversies. 2 ' If one prefers
to call this specialization a "concentration in certain fields of law,"
so be it." The fact remains that "experienced" people (if not "ex-
perts") will get to the issues faster and often more accurately
resolve the problems involved therein.
We can no longer subscribe to the theory that administrative
hearings must be conducted in an adversary setting, assumed by
many to be part of the foundation of the American legal system."' It
has not worked that way in the past; it will not work in the future.
Administrative agencies get their evidence by adopting a mixture of
125. Supra note 100, at 1327. See also Kaufman, The Judicial Crisis, Court
Delay, and the Para-Judge, 54 JUDICATURE 145 (1970).
126. Griswold, Rationing Justice-The Supreme Court's Caseload and What
the Court Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 337-39 (1975).
127. RCA v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 420 (1951); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194, 209 (1947); Ford Motor Co. v. Commissioner of Patents, 387 F. Supp. 675
(D.D.C. 1973).
128. White, Allocating Power Between Agencies and Courts: The Legacy of
Justice Brandeis, 1974 DUKE L.J. 195, 213; Comment, Abuse of Discretion" Ad-
ministrative Expertise v. Judicial Surveillance, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 40, 41-42 (1966).
129. See generally Currie & Goldman, Judicial Review of Federal Ad-
ministrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 68-70 (1975);
Nathanson, The Administrative Court Proposal, 57 VA. L. REV. 996, 999-1001 (1971).
130. Bernstein, supra note 69, at 330; Gellhorn, supra note 77, at 244.
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truth-seeking devices, be they adversary or inquisitorial. Under cer-
tain circumstances all the needed evidence can be obtained by a
mere exchange of letters or by a questionnaire, and the need for an
adversary debate to get to the truth is not always obvious or com-
pelling.181
It is important that judges handling administrative law cases
be knowledgeable in the intricacies of certain areas of substantive
administrative law.182 This does not mean that the basic principles of
administrative procedural law do not apply to all the activities of ad-
ministrative agencies. Judge Pfeiffer's theory that we ought to have
a separate corps of administrative law judges is most enticing. The
question is whether the ALJs would not be better judges if they
were in fact judges, specializing in administrative law"' and func-
tioning in their proper slot in the administrative law system.
The administrative law should be speedy;"' it is not at present.
By adopting the system advocated herein, we would speed up the
administrative process, as intended by the legislature, and as is in-
deed necessary in a complex technological society,'135 without sacrific-
ing fairness at the same time.
The suggestions made in this article focus on the basic con-
cepts underlying the system rather than on side issues which are
merely symptomatic of the need for reform and which have led to
the many reform proposals in the past. It is submitted that any
change, to be a change for the better, must be compatible with the
role of the administrative process in our society. Unfortunately,
most of the changes to date have been merely formal changes or
have only added to the present confusion. Changes in form are most
often superficial and result in patchwork repair, the net result of
which is to confuse the real issues and make other equally unattrac-
tive changes necessary.' 6 Eventually the original objective is lost.
131. Bernstein, supra note 69, at 330; Gellhorn, supra note 77, at 244.
132. Miller, The Education and Development of Administrative Law Judges,
25 AD. L. REV. 1 (1973).
133. Pfeiffer, supra note 61, at 217, 218, 222, 231.
134. Schwartz, The Administrative Agency in Historical Perspective, 36 IND.
L.J. 261, 268 (1961). Rothman, Four Ways to Reduce Administrative Delay, 28 TENN.
L. REV. 332 (1961); "[Tjhe progress we ultimately make in combatting congestion and
delay depends in a great measure upon the administrative and the enforcement agen-
cies of government." See E. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTS 7 (4th ed. 1960). Prettyman, The Nature of Administrative Law, 44 VA. L.
REV. 685, 687 (1958).
135. White, supra note 128, at 213-15.
136. Monroe, The Urgent Case for American Law Reform: A Judge's
Response to a Lawyer's Plea, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 466, 482, 486-89 (1970).
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The adoption of a separate administrative court system should
not entail the hiring of any more judicial personnel than is currently
contemplated under various proposals."7 In fact, it is possible that
this reform might result in a lesser number of personnel being re-
quired." A concrete projection of the required needs to implement
the proposed reform can be postponed until the acceptance of the
principle of reform outlined herein. It is suggested, however, that
the administrative law judges, in addition to having adequate
secretarial and clerical help, have available an administrative court
staff of economists and other experts in related social fields.
Another advantage of this proposal would be to bring the ad-
ministrative process closer to the people through decentralization.
The agencies would have to fight their cases in the "local" ad-
ministrative court which, presumably, would sit in the present
federal circuits. Nothing should prevent maximum utilization of the
ALJs by having them sit in a busy circuit when their own workload
permits it. The procedural rules of these administrative courts
should, of necessity, be less formal than those governing the conduct
of the civilian courts, thus opening up the mysterious and awesome
governmental process to the public and permitting a better
understanding of government action to those affected by it.
This proposal for a distinct administrative law court system
preserves the integrity of the administrative process as it was
originally intended to function. It would reestablish the agency as
the responsible source of decision-making in consonance with the
Congressional mandate.
A COMPARISON OF VARIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFORM
PROPOSALS WITH THE ONE SUGGESTED IN THIS ARTICLE
Some authors have suggested that we adopt the French ad-
ministrative law system' without fully realizing that administrative
law in France has very little to do with administrative law in the
United States." It is useful to look to other systems for possible
solutions to some of our problems, but in doing so, we must under-
stand the tradition and the system from which we wish to borrow a
new concept. New concepts, taken out of their natural context, will
137. Burger, supra note 122, at 932-33.
138. Monroe, supra note 136, at 469, 480.
139. Rotunda, supra note 19.
140. Id. See generally Riesenfeld, supra note 112, pt. 1 at 48 et seq., pt. 2 at
400-32, pt. 3 at 715-48 (1938).
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not grow within our own system unless they are made compatible
with it. The ombudsman idea is a good example."" It is obvious that
the Swedish concept of an ombudsman cannot be transferred, as is,
to our American tradition and survive."2 We may adopt an approx-
imation of an ombudsman, as where he or she would be a negotiator
or an arbitrator with relatively limited power. However, it is
unrealistic, in the light of the American political tradition, to expect
that any one individual" ' be given the type of powers which the
Swedish ombudsman has.
Other examples of "patchwork" reform proposals abound. Some
have merit, such as that of Philip Elman, former member of the
Federal Trade Commission. He suggests, in an interesting and per-
suasively written article, the creation of Trade Courts to which the
F.T.C. and private parties could complain of transgressions of the
F.T.C. Act."'
Mr. Elman's proposal, while basically sound, addresses itself to
his narrow area of interest and does not fit in the broader ad-
ministrative law scheme. Furthermore, it does not meet the conten-
tion that the total administrative process should be left in the hands
of the agencies, with the opportunity by an administrative court to
review their action. To do otherwise is to forget the basic purpose
behind the creation of administrative agencies. We have strayed far
from the original concepts of Dean Landis"5 and others,' but the
time has come to reexamine the basic purpose of an administrative
agency.
In a complex industrialized society, the fact that an ad-
ministrative agency issues regulations, supervises the implementa-
tion of these regulations and even prosecutes transgressions of its
own regulations is not at all shocking."7 On the contrary, it fits the
concept of more expeditious and possibly cheaper action in the
hands of "experts""8 as contemplated by the original proponents of
141. Davis, Ombudsmen in America: Officers to Criticize Administrative Ac-
tion, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (1961); Gellhorn, supra note 130, at 248; Wyner, Com-
plaint Resolution in Nebraska: Citizens, Bureaucrats and the Ombudsman, 54 NEB. L.
REV. 1 (1975).
142. Gellhorn, supra note 77, at 248-50.
143. Williams, supra note 19, at 281.
144. Elman, supra note 3, at 1048.
145. J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
146. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1965); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1962).
147. Jones, supra note 89.
148. Freedman, supra note 85, at 1052, 1056.
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the administrative process."" This objective has been perverted, to
some extent, by the over-judicialization of these agencies. Therein
lies one of the main weaknesses of the present system.
Establishing identical review boards at different agency levels
and complex standards for review within each agency would be both
cumbersome and expensive, and would not necessarily fit the agen-
cy's mission."' To burden an agency with several layers of in-house
appellate reviews is costly to the taxpayer and unproductive for the
agency, delays decision making, and occasionally may result in an
"exercise in futility.""'
Within the agency, it is sufficient to have a hearing before an
examiner"12 (an agency employee working under powers delegated to
him by the agency for managerial reasons) whose recommended
decisions are either adopted or rejected by the agency. An aggrieved
party should be able to appeal to an administrative court, as is pro-
posed in this article.
Many worthwhile suggestions for reform, while individually
representative of the patchwork approach referred to herein, can be
integrated into this proposal. Thus, Professor Cramton's suggestions
on solving delays in administrative proceedings,"' Mr. Hector's pro-
posal, 5' as well as Mr. Minow's recommendations,"' contain much of
value if integrated with a complete overhaul of the present ad-
ministrative system. While one may not totally agree with the Ash
Council,"' many of its conclusions present worthwhile facets which
149. E. ROOT, supra note 90.
150. Hearings on S. 518 before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice
and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 223
(1967) (Comments of Chairman Frank W. McCullough).
151. Without unduly traumatizing the present ALJs, it would seem best to
revert to the title of "hearing examiner" when referring to the hearing officer within
the agency in order to distinguish him from the proposed ALJ, ie., a member of the
Administrative Law Court.
152. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); 5 U.S.C. § 557(b)
(1976).
153. Cramton, supra note 69.
154. Hector, supra note 57.
155. Minow, supra note 77.
156. THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATIONS: A NEW
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES
(1971) (hereinafter REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES]. The main objective of the Ash
Council seems to be to remove the regulatory agencies from a case by case decision-
making process which is inextricably interwoven with rulemaking and the ad-
ministrative process in general. Nathanson, supra note 2, at 86.
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must be considered if one wishes to adopt a meaningful reform of
our administrative process. ' "6
The proposal in this article, to create an administrative court
system outside and above the administrative agencies, meets the
many objections to various proposals for reform discussed herein.
We do need reform urgently, but we must use a radical approach to
solve the many problems in our legal system in a manner consistent
with our own heritage and tradition.
The federal courts of appeals are experiencing increasing case
loads."M The author has conducted some statistical surveys which
basically confirm what others have found.'59 Thus, it is apparent that
the dramatic increase in the last year surveyed is due to the recent
meteoric increase of Freedom of Information Act cases.'16
There is a small proportionate increase of the case load in the
appellate court system as opposed to the district courts."8 ' Professor
Nathanson states that "administrative appeals constitute only about
100/0 of the case load of the court of appeals. Furthermore, this
number does not seem to be increasing. In 1971 there were 1,383
[administrative] appeals, while in 1967 there were 1,385 appeals."'62
This, in general, agrees with the statistics secured for this arti-
cle. Slight variations are due to the fact that the statistical survey
brings this data up to 1976, as opposed to Professor Nathanson's
article which was written in 1973.' For ready reference the sum-
maries of the statistical surveys, as gleaned from various court
reports, are best presented in tabular form:
157. REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES, supra note 156, at 21-22, 47, 49, 50, 51.
158. Nathanson, supra note 2, at 86.
159. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS (1976).
160. In 1971 administrative law cases represented about 19% of the caseload in
the District Courts; in 1975 it had risen to 21.4% and in 1976 administrative law cases
rose to 32.2% of the total caseload. See Table III, infra, page 254.
161. Nathanson, supra note 2, at 86. See Carrington, supra note 91, at 543. In
the Court of Appeals, administrative law cases have risen steadily from 11% in 1971,
to 14% in 1976. See Table II, infra, page 253.
162. Nathanson, supra note 2, at 87.
163. Id.
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Professor Carrington proposed two to five subject matter divi-
sions within the present appellate court system in order to achieve
"some degree of specialization."" ' The author's agreement with the
terms of this concept leads to a quarrel with Professor Nathanson's
statement that the subject of federal administrative law is not an
appropriate "subject matter for judicial specialization,"'65 on the
ground that any such flat assertion is not borne out by experience. 66
Nevertheless, Professor Nathanson's proposals, many of which merit
serious consideration, should be addressed. They are representative
of the patchwork approach to reform complained of in this article,
yet are not inconsistent with the objectives herein when effected in
their proper areas. Let us analyze briefly seven of the recommenda-
tions in that article in sequence and in the author's own words:
(1) "[A]n increasing case load can be accommodated in some of
the circuits by increasing the number of judges."'6 7 One may re-
spond by pointing out that merely increasing the number of judges
in the existing judiciary is not going to resolve the problem, because
a better degree of understanding of administrative law by the
judges is also necessary in order to cure the present confusion.
(2) "The most obvious immediate remedy is the re-drawing of
the boundaries of the Circuits .... ."168
This suggestion begs the question, for it is not a revamping of
the boundaries of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals which is going
to resolve the problems created by increased administrative litiga-
tion. Moreover, this is a change which might be as difficult to obtain
politically as the creation of a separate administrative law court
system.
(3) "[Tlhe number of circuits should be moderately increased so
as to keep the number of judges from becoming as unwieldy as in
the Fifth Circuit." '69
While few will quarrel with this suggestion as a useful reform
of the federal judiciary, it has no realistic bearing on the problems
of the delivery of administrative legal services.
(4) "[A] determined effort should be made to restrict the
164. Carrington, supra note 91; Nathanson, supra note 2.
165. Nathanson, supra note 2, at 89.
166. Note, 81 HARv. L. REV., supra note 101, at 1329-30.
167. Nathanson, supra note 2, at 91.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 91-92.
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jurisdiction of the federal courts as a whole .... ,;170 i.e., do away
with diversity jurisdiction, among others.
This, of course, is a drastic revamping of the federal judicial
system which does not address the need for reform of the ad-
ministrative law process. One may point out that the federal courts'
work-load would be considerably lightened by adopting a separate
administrative court system without curtailing the expectations, if
not the rights, of the taxpayers.
(5) "[O]ne of these [suggested jurisdictional changes] has been
some system of discretionary appeals rather than appeal as of
right .... 71
It would seem that there is a necessity for a minimum ap-
pellate review which should not be discretionary. Psychologically, at
least, part of the judicial system has to do with giving people the
feeling of being fully heard .' To curtail the quality and availability
of judicial service is not the answer that today's society expects, and
Professor Nathanson seems to agree with this assessment.
(6) "[A] court consisting of temporarily assigned circuit court
judges, to which cases might be referred by the United States
Supreme Court."
M
This is another "temporary" modification of the judicial system,
a variation of Professor Kurland's proposal for "a single but final
court of appeals charged with jurisdiction over non-constitutional
questions arising in the federal courts."'17' Its fault lies in failing to
squarely face the fact that different problems call for different
remedies and, sometimes, for the restructuring of a system unable
to cope with the challenge. Professor Nathanson's suggestion has
the same weakness as the Chief Justice's proposal in connection
with an intermediate adjunct Supreme Court.' Politically, such a
notion is no more palatable than the "court packing" suggestion.7'
170. Id. at 92.
171. Id.
172. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970); Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474, 496-97 (1959); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator of Wage & Hour Div., Dep't of
Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941); Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393 (1934).
173. Nathanson, supra note 2, at 95.
174. Id. See Kurland, The Supreme Court Should Decide Less and Explain
More, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1968, §6 (Magazine), at 34.
175. Statement issued by Chief Justice Burger (1974), printed in 61 A.B.A.J.
303 (1975).
176. See generally Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's
"Court-Packing" Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347.
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At least symbolically, every person feels that they are entitled,
under our system, to have a hearing at the final or "supreme" court
level. If overwork is the problem, then it would be far better to in-
crease the number of Supreme Court Justices regardless of opposi-
tion to "court packing," and to distribute the case load on a "col-
legial" basis.
(7) "[The above proposal] would in effect create either an in-
termediate or a final appellate court with respect to issues of
federal statutory construction and important issues of federal ad-
ministrative law if there is indeed a difference between the two.' 177
Now, in a roundabout way, Professor Nathanson reaches a con-
clusion which is, to some extent, consistent with the author's conten-
tion. At the core of meaningful reform in the field of administrative
justice lies the realization that there are administrative law issues
which are, in many ways, different from day-to-day private litiga-
tion.
The proposal that an Administrative Law Court be created ap-
pears to be validated by any criteria one may choose, along with the
concept of placing above the Administrative Law Court level a Final
Court of Administrative Appeals which would dispose of all ques-
tions raised by the various Administrative Courts. There would be
no appeal from that Court's decision to the Supreme Court unless
genuine constitutional issues were raised.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, judicial review is what much of the con-
cern for the need for administrative law reform is all about.1 78 This
article has addressed the question of the type of review needed.
Whatever the disadvantages of the proposal presented here, 7 '
it is time that our thinking proceed along a productive and sound
analysis of the real issues involved. Until now, the bar has not been
willing to discuss reforms in the administrative law area by looking
at the whole structure of our judicial system and the quality of the
delivery of justice to all of our citizens. Any kind of meaningful
reform, aside from being based on a correct analysis of the issues,
177. Nathanson, supra note 2, at 96.
178. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967); Cody, Regula-
tions Having the Effect of Law, 21 AD. L. REV. 347, 348 (1969); Note, Extending the
Authority of the Judiciary to Review Administrative Agency Decisions, 1972 Wis. L.
REV. 613; Comment, Judicial Review-Due Process, 59 Ky. L.J. 216 (1970).
179. Nathanson, supra note 2, at 88-90.
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must have its roots within the traditions of our legal system, up-
dated to serve our contemporary and future needs.
Administrative agencies, within the confines of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (amended to accommodate the proposed
changes), would finally function as Congress intended. Agency action
should be subject to review by Administrative Law Courts staffed
primarily from the ranks of present administrative law judges. Ap-
peal from the Administrative Courts would be to a Supreme Ad-
ministrative Law Court, the decisions of which would be final, ex-
cept for genuine constitutional issues which could be appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States.
This proposal reconciles the many different viewpoints expres-
sed by various scholars and others concerned with our ad-
ministrative law system. It fits into our contemporary legal system,
which remains the one best suited to deal fairly with the individual
in his quest for justice within the framework of a modern
technological society.
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